Modern File systems like the Cryptographic Log Structured File System are aimed to provide security and confidentiality. Current deployments of such File Systems do not ensure the integrity of encrypted data, stored on disk. Due to Kernel bugs, racing conditions and arbitrary dead-locks, CLFS data can be damaged or modified by users and intruders. Financial systems are particularly concerned with security as business continuity is essential to the produced output. That's why, we considered necessary to intervene in two directions. First we will modify the way keys are stored in the system, as their safe storage is a clue point to the whole protection this system assures. Implementing a Trusted Platform Module is our suggestion to the case. Afterwards, provided this secure environment, our aim lies towards ensuring data integrity on CLFS without compromising the overall performance. This paper considers the standard data verification methods, with the main goal to overcome one of its major limitations, low performance of File System check-summing. To improve the performance of this process we try to study and examine various design choices and propose metadata checksumming. Several tests are made to prove that this added functionality does not significantly affect performance.
Introduction
A financial system is meant to store typically large amounts of data, which may be either critical or sensitive, so they need to be protected. In common environments like Data Centers, information is exposed to continuous risks and we need to make sure these will not affect business continuity, as such a thing may lead to severe and cost-prone consequences for companies and business. Modern File Systems, such as CLFS ensure confidentiality of data, encrypting them. Usually File Systems that comprise data encryption result to perform considerably slower than non-cryptographic File Systems. New techniques implemented in CLFS manage to reach its performance goals, as they go close to fast local file systems. Encryption is a native characteristic of this file system and it ensures that information is accessible only to those authorized to have access, while not being affected by the overhead of encryption with more than an order of magnitude. Being native means including the data encryption code into the file system code. We are generally used to systems, where encryption is added as a layer, thus allowing it to be bypassed, but this is not our case, as Figure 1 demonstrates. We consider CLFS an efficient cryptographic file system, one worth working on and trying to improve. Further analysis has spotted its main drawbacks, where we will concentrate. These actually reside in two main points, the lack of data integrity and the lack of secure techniques implementation during the key storing processes. Although confidentiality is an important part of the overall system storage security, it is not everything. Considering hard disks malfunctioning, data on it can be damaged even though it is encrypted. It can also be affected by attackers, both physically or while communicating over an insecure network. Physical access on disk allows the attacker to change the unencrypted part, which in our case comprises the ifile, without the system knowing it. Considering systems which implement Cloud Computing security gets even more fragile. Thus, suggesting a way to make the file system immune from such data corruption, either as a result of a malicious attack or hardware failure, is our scope. We aim to protect our sensitive data, checking for inconsistencies, to obtain data integrity The second important drawback resides on the lack of security in the storage of cryptographic keys. Currently the system is based on software solutions, as it uses only a common passphrase to protect the key. We propose and implement another more stable solution, which uses hardware aid, the TPM (Trusted Platform Model), described by Pearson (2002) to securely store keys. The tests made to evaluate the influence of integrity checking on performance are built on this secure environment. The following paragraphs of this paper will be organized as follows. First we will describe the context of our working environment, CLFS (Cryptographic Log Structured File System). This work comes to life to improve this file system, thus a detailed explanation of the techniques it uses to avoid the latency encryption carries, is needed. Further we will go deeper into the trusted platform module, to point out the benefits of its involvement into our system. After that, a list of the techniques used to achieve the integrity of data requirement will be unfolded. They will be examined in a selective prospective, to pick out the most congruent solution to our specific case, as Figure 2 we will give our approach towards the solution of the integrity issue and conclude the idea.
Literature review
In this section, we consider important to unfold the features of the Cryptographic Log Structured File System described by Knuttson (2002) , to justify our choice. To make a long story short, the crucial argument that supports CLFS is performance. First, as we noticed the system lacks a secure storing for keys. To improve this drawback, we consider the Trusted Computing Platform. Being TPM its main component, that's where we will focus. TCP has been proposed and successfully adopted in various analog scenarios, like Chen et al. (2010) explains. We believe it will be efficient even in our system, as it resulted with an overhead of only 0.3% in Jin et al. (2011) , which discusses a similar encrypted storage system. The difference between the above systems and ours is that CLFS overweighs them in performance. However, our objective will be reached if the overhead's percentage is lower than 10%, as this won't be detectable by the user, so it is more than acceptable. Previous cryptographic file systems come in different implementation, the encryption can be block based, as well as disk based, on network file systems or stackable ones. Their common characteristic is bumping into the knot of being too CPU sensitive. To provide performance solutions CLFS concentrates on previous cryptographic File Systems weaknesses, being the speed of the encryption algorithm used and the writing latency. Let's go deeper into these topics. a. CLFS considered that improving the speed of the algorithm used to encrypt would be useful both ways of read and write operations. Let's take a look at a couple of the most known cryptographic file systems, to check out for their deficiencies. Blaze (1993) implemented CFS as a network file system and its main drawback resulted the continuous context switching overhead. A completely different approach was treated by Zadok (1998) in CryptFS, as it is a stackable file system. This provides it with portability allowing execution above any kind of native file system. It also comes out to be faster than CFS by a factor that fluctuates from 2 to 37 times. The bottleneck of this file system is precisely the encryption algorithm it uses, blowfish. The algorithm used in CLFS is SEAL 3.0. It is used exactly to surpass the knot a non efficient algorithm brings to the system. This is achieved by utilizing two major characteristics of the algorithm, namely speed and pre-computation. The tests made by Rogaway and Coppersmith (1997) demonstrated that SEAL uses approximately 4 cycles to process a byte. SEAL works as a stream cipher, where the encryption depends not only from the plain text and the encryption key, but also from the position of the data. The key is 160 bit long and SEAL uses it to map a 32 bit string to one composed of L bit, where L is less than 64KB. The trick that makes the work with SEAL this fast is pre-computation. Being LFS the ground upon which CLFS was built, allows us to know precisely the position of the next write and that's the reason why we can pre-compute the whole key stream, so that the encryption process is reduced to a simple XOR operation between the key and the plain text. b. The underlying file system is another strength point. The speed of I/O bound applications is limited by the write performance of the file system. A log-structured file system is designed for high write throughput. Rosenblum and Ousterhout (1992) designed LFS (Log Structured File System), a file system with a relatively different behavior from its predecessors. They introduced the idea of a continuous log, where data and metadata are written. The majority of file systems put a great emphasis on spatial locality and transform their data without changing its location, which leads to slow seeks. LFS assumes that taking care of locality will no longer be effective, as cache memory size is increasing to the extends of satisfying all read operations. Storing data in a log avoids seeks, therefore minimizes the movement of disk's head and maximizes write throughput.
The benefits of using it as a base for CLFS is that we know where the position of the next write is located. Besides, file system writes are only performed at the end of the log which means that inconsistencies can only be located in the last segment of the log, which greatly speeds up crash recovery. c. The Cryptographic Log Structured File System is very similar to LFS, as much as concerns its overall format. Its building blocks are divided into segments, which in turn become active, as shown in Figure 3 . The initial part of each of these segments consists of the so called summary block. This structure is composed of a set of pointers that indicate the position of the successive summary block. That is how the idea of a continuous log is implemented in LFS.
FIGURE 3. LFS SEGMENT ORGANIZATION
Upon creation of the file system a random key is automatically generated for the first segment. Afterwards the segment key and the key stream offset are stored encrypted in the corresponding segment summaries. The key stream is calculated increasing it with the segment size. To increase performance CLFS uses a cache to store the expanded keys and their positions. In a read operation CLFS would initially act the same as LFS, by searching for the desired block to read. The search would start by the index file's inode stored in the superblock, where we would find the inode map, followed from the inode. These operations are the majority of times bypassed, since this data are stored in the cache. Obviously, CLFS to ensure effective encryption cannot stop at the point of LFS. It has to read the exact position of the segment summary from the ifile. After reading it, decrypt the segment key and the key offset, to generate the key stream. Finally the read data has to be XOR-ed with the key stream to decrypt them. The write operation differs from LFS only in a couple of steps. The first chunk of data is removed from the list and its key is already known, so we can perform the XOR operation. This is done with all the chunks of data and afterwards the segment summary is changed.
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As previously mentioned, our goal is building security facilities on a fast Cryptographic Log-Structured File System. The second step to increased security is dealing with key management mechanisms. This issue is one of the most challenging, but a successful process is crucial and of course shouldn't be neglected. This is due to the fact that encryption is not an undefeatable solution to security. To mention here that it doesn't solve access problems, neither data corruption issues. These problems can be caused by an outrageous number of factors, considering the increasing scale of security threats, coming from malicious attacks. The current deployment of CLFS holds up on a user-supplied passphrase to protect the encryption keys, but research has concluded that a merely software approach is not enough to security. A way out of this has bloomed in the recent years and is gaining market access. It consists on searching for reliability into a hardware, which is equipped with trusted components, called a trusted platform. Building a trusted platform certainly requires adding extra hardware modules, if they already aren't part of the architecture. Whereas, logically these platforms are constructed in various layers and components. The main one is TPM (Trusted Platform Module), which is intended to provide integrity, i.e. the system acting as it is expected. To achieve this the platform has the so called, roots of trust. Their integrity cannot be proven in any way, that's the reason why they have to be assumed as trusted modules. Having a trusting hardware environment, will give us two main advantages: protected capabilities and shielded memory locations. This means we are equipped with memory locations, where storing is considered to be secure and we can utilize capabilities like cryptographic key management and random numbers generation. This is shown in Figure  4 .
Data verification techniques
Ensuring data integrity is fundamental to computer systems. Several factors may induce to data errors, to mention media failures, kernel bugs and racing conditions. Even an attacker who has reached to gain administrator privileges can modify the data. Threats are multidirectional and our system cannot be left unprotected, so our approach is based on the existing cryptographic file system to which the integrity checking capability is added. Below we will analyze the most widespread techniques to verify information.
-Making exact copies of our data, i.e. mirroring, can be a way of managing it reliably. The process would comprise the comparison of our data with the mirrored one, before operating with it, as in Figure 5 . This method would easily detect changes in one of the replicas, providing integrity in case the changes occur because of hardware malfunctioning. However, it doesn't tell which of the copies is the genuine one. It is not able to perform correctly in the case of an intruder, either. This is due to the fact that both of the replicas can be changed, so that the system lacks the tools to detect intrusion and integrity is not obtained. The inefficiency of this method also arises when we consider the storage space it requires and the time we need to spend checking both replicas. -Parity is a simple yet effective method to assure integrity protection. The procedure is as follows: one bit is added to the stream, as shown in Figure 6 . The condition on this added bit is to be the equal to the binary sum of the bits. These parity bits are able to detect only single errors, which makes this technique primitive. We would get a result where a stream with two errors is considered valid. This definitely doesn't fulfill our security requirements. -Check-sums are exactly the same as parity with two changes: to create the check-sum of a pattern of entities of length n bits, an n-bit entity (the check-sum) is added and the modulo 2 sum of the entities and the check-sum is constrained to be zero. This is shown in Figure 7 . CRC is more secure than check-summing, but it needs more calculation, as it adopts a more complex technique. Check-sums can be implemented in various ways, we can compute a per block check-sum, or a per file check-sum. The latter proposes two alternatives, storing check-sums apart from the data, otherwise interleaving data files and check-sums with the purpose of making more efficient use of data locality. -CRC is a method which seeks to improve on check-sums by increasing the complexity of the arithmetic. The idea is to calculate the cyclic redundancy check by using polynomial division and not just a simple binary sum, as we previously saw in the check-sum algorithm. The stream of bits is divided by a binary number used as a coefficient. However, this added complexity does not fit within our system and that is the reason we are not going to concentrate on the topic.
Our approach
To constitute our design model we have developed our idea in several layers, each of which is built on answering one single question per layer. As we previously explained ensuring data verification in a file system is essential to its integrity. On the other hand we need to preserve as much as possible the major advantage of our native file system CLFS, which despite being cryptographic fully meets performance requirements. So, naturally the decisions we need to make involve which method of verification is more appropriate, what part of the data will be verified unless all of it, where will this extra information be stored and finally how frequently the verification will occur. Let's analyze them further. Check-summing is the most common method to ensure data integrity, as described by Sivathanu et al. (2004) . If we want our data to be protected from intruders as well as from transient errors, the check-sum needs to be protected with a secure hashing scheme such as SHA1 (1997) . We considered efficient to compute check-sums for metadata. It comprises all the inodes and the ifile. Checking different fields of the metadata will allow us to find out if any malicious modification has been made to the data, because almost any modification to our data will be reflected to the metadata, as explained by Patil (2004) . Furthermore, this decision is more advantageous as the amount of metadata is considerably less than data, and results to be efficient on timing, hence giving a better performance. Knuttson (2002) , after implementing his cryptographic File System, made several tests to check its performance affected by the overhead encryption introduced. It resulted to perform close to non-cryptographic File-Systems, being an ideal solution for systems which store large amounts of sensitive data. Figure 8 . Figure 9 shows the comparison of the two systems during a compilation test. After a comparative analysis of the tests, we notice that the overhead reaches the margins of 4% on compilation tests and 6% on tar tests. The first is due to the fact that compilation is a CPU bound application and is not particularly affected by the File System, whereas the latter is slightly affected. We also have to emphasize that the gap between the two graphs is due to the long time the compilation test needs to complete, given such file sizes.
Conclusion
Our main objective is trying to add integrity to a cryptographic File System, like CLFS. This goal initially sounds risky from the performance point of view, but choosing the most appropriate method and a reduced amount of data to check is the clue to success. Our solution consists on check-summing only the part of metadata, to provide integrity of information. We also managed to address the key storing security issue, by adding a TCP, a security platform in which we trust. This hardware solution overweighs previous exclusively software ones. Our benchmark involved tar and compilation tests over different sized files in an Improved CLFS, which check-sums metadata and stores keys in a trusted environment, showed an overhead that varies from 4-6%. This is an appealing result, considering Cloud Computing and other systems, where CLFS is intended to work. So, we managed to provide secure key storage and highly secure metadata integrity checking, i.e. the data stored in our system are correct, or at least cannot be modified undetectably.
To start our logic we made an assumption, we considered that checking the integrity of both data and metadata would considerably affect performance, while not evidently improving integrity. Metadata check-summing was considered sufficient to meet our requirements. But, in spite of this, further work can be done on testing what this overhead would exactly be. As a conclusion, we successfully managed to add a reliable hardware environment for key storage and to improve a cryptographic file system, enabling it with integrity checking without sacrificing performance.
